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RECENT CASES
The theory that deductibility depends upon legislative grace" be-
came popular shortly after the influence of the principle of "con-
struing deductibility provisions against the government"'" ended.'" It
has been frequently held that a Commissioner's finding is presump-
tively correct."1
The legislative history of the tax treatment of school expenses of-
fers little prospect that the principle of the instant case will be ex-
tended to situations where the teacher is not under a legal com-
pulsion tQ attend summer school in order to maintain eligibility to
teach. Such expenses have always been considered personal and
non-deductible where the teacher attended summer school voluntar-
ily as a means toward professional advancement," though expenses
occurred in analogous situations have been found deductible as "or-
dinary and necessary."'9
WILLS-ORAL CONTRACT TO MAKE MUTUAL RECIPROCAL WILLS-EN-
FORCEABILITY OF AFTER RECEIPT OF BENEFTS UNDER.-The husband and
wife executed mutual reciprocal wills according to their oral contract
whereby each agreed to devise to the other his or her entire estate.
Further provisions in the wills provided for equal distribution of the
remainder, upon the death of the survivor, to the niece of W and
the niece of H. Upon the death of W, H received the benfits
of her will. H died, and a subsequent will by him was, probated
wherein his niece, D, was named sole beneficiary. D, the
niece of H, is now sued in this action in her personal capacity and as
executrix of the will of H, by P, the niece of W, for specific per-
formance of the alleged oral contract entered into by H and VP
wherein they agreed to make the aforementioned mutual reciprocal
wills. The trial court held that the evidence established the existence
of such contract; that upon its breach by H he became liable to P;
but, that P failed to present a proper claim for money damages to
the executrix of the estate of H during the time prescribed by law and
as required by the Statute of Non-claim and was therefore divested
of a remedy; and that P is not entitled to equitable relief in that she
had an adequate remedy at law. Upon appeal it was held that the trial
court erred; that P was not divested of remedy by the provisions of
14 Deputy v. DuPont, 808 U.S. 488 (1940); cf. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helver-
Ing, 292 U.S. 435 (1934) (one of the first cases indicating a change in policy.)
13 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917).
10 White v. United States, 805 U.S. 281 (1938).
11 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); White v. United
States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938).
u9 0. D. 892, 4 -Cum. Bull. 209 (1921): "Expenses Incurred by school teach-
ers In attending summer school are in the nature of personal expenses incurred in
advancing their education and are not deductible in computing net income."
'9 Denny, 33 B. T. A. 788 (1935) (permitting actor to deduct physical train-
ing expenses); Hempel v. Commissioner, P-H (1947) T. C. Mem. Dec. 1
47-183 (1947) (permitting opera singer to deduct expenses of voice coaching. And
see Hutchinson. 13 B.T.A. 1187 (1928).
2 N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0706 (1943) validates such contracts.
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the Statute of Non-claim, and that P was entitled to specific per-
fonnance. O'Connor v. Immele, 43 N. W. 2d 649 (N. D. 1950).
That a contract to make a will is valid and not opposed to public
policy is so well settled as to merit little discussion.' The legal prin-
ciples applicable to such contracts are not different from those gov-
erning other contracts.' Because such contracts are usually oral and
informal, difficult legal problems frequently arise. Where all nec-
essary elements of a contract are present, such as offer, acceptance,
and consideration, as in the instant case, the first hurdle which the
oral contract must surmount is that of the Statute of Frauds.' The
courts have been virtually unanimous in declaring that, to the ex-
tent that realty is involved, these oral contracts fall within the section
of the Statute of Frauds relating to the sale of interests in land;'
where personality is involved the matter is by no means as certain.'
The court in the instant case apparently assumed the contract to be
within the Statute of Frauds but invoked the well-settled doctrine
that the part performance of such an oral contract removes it in
equity.' The part performance relied upon in the instant case was
the acceptance and retention by H of the benefits of W's will. An
objection might be made that to permit the enforceability of such a
contract would do violence to the Statute of Wills in that it permits
the disposition of property at death without regard to the formal
requirements of the Statute of Wills. The answer is that the property
passes under the contract and not by virtue of the will;' the will is
merely the method selected by the parties to carry out the terms of
the contract. Even after the establishment of the contract and the
breach thereof the further question arises as to the remedies availU
able. First of all, the modern view is that a third party donee,' or
creditor" beneficiary may maintain an action on the contract. Since
the remedy usually sought is specific performance it is necessary to
establish equity jurisdiction. Nearly all the historical bases of equity
jurisdiction can be summed up in the broad statement that where
the legal remedy is inadequate equity will intervene to give relief.
2 Ex Parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 239 (1917); Brooks v. Yarbrough, 37 F.2d
527, 531 (10th Cir. 1930); Kleeburg v. Sehrader, 69 Minn. 136, 72 N.W. 59 (1897).
* Atkinson, Wills § 68 (1937); Rollison, Wills § 188 (1939).
4 Some jurisdictions have negatived this problem altogether by the passage
of statutes invalidating oral contracts to make wills. Ariz. Code Ann. § 58-101 (1939) ;
Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (Deering 1949); Del. Rev. Code § 3106 (1935); Mass. Gen.
Laws c. 259 § 5 (1921).
Hirsc .,erg v. Horowitz, 105 N.J.L. 210, 143 Atl. 351 (1928); Loper v.
Sheldon's Estate, 120 Wis. 26, 97 N.W. 524 (1903.)
s See Ohlendiek v. Schuler, 30 F.2d 5 (1929); Appeal of Hull, 82 Conn. 647,
74 Atl. 925 (1910).
Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); 4 Page, Wills
1 1721 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
s Rollison, Wills § 187 (1939); Eagleton, Zoint and Mutual Wills: Mutual
Promises to Devise as a Means of (onveyancing, 15 Corn. L. Q. 358 (1930).
9 2 Williston, Contracts J 357 (rev. ed. 1936); and see Restatement Contracts
§ 138 (1932).
10 2 Williston, Contracts § 361 (rev. ed. 1936); and see Restatement, Contracts §
138 (1932).
RECENT CASES
The mere fact that an action at law would lie for damages for breach
of the contract will not bar equity's jurisdiction if the remedy in
equity is better adapted to render complete justice.' Moreover,
equity has always regarded realty as unique and has given specific
performance of land contracts.' As a practical matter, equity is in a
better position to give complete relief in such cases since it can im-
pose a constructive trust on the property as was done in the instant
case. In addition equity is not bound to any stereotyped form of re-
lief and can adjust its remedies to the requirements of the particular
facts of. the case." It is therefore submitted that the court in the in-
stant case properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction.
As a defense against an action based on a contract to make mutual
reciprocal wills it is sometimes urged that a failure to comply with
the Statute of Non-claim forever bars any remedy. This contention
usually fails, as in the instant case, in that such action is not con-
strued as a claim against the estate of the deceased but a claim of a
property interest in that estate which is itself subject to claims of
creditors against the estate.1 Where the claim is properly filed within
the time allowed for the filing of claims by creditors this issue does
not arise.
In conclusion it may be stated that the contract-to-make-mutual-
reciprocal-wills device has certain advantages in that it allows ab-
solute freedom of action by the survivor of the contracting parties,
subject only to a duty not to make excessive gifts or otherwise to
attempt to disappoint the ultimate beneficiaries, with respect to the
property bequeathed to such survivor. It is usable where, as in
the instant case, the spouse is the prime object of the testator's bounty
but where the testator wishes to insure an ultimate distribution which
does not exclude secondary objects of his bounty. Unfortunately,
this device all too often results in costly litigation, especially where
the contract is oral and informal.
m McClintock, Equity § § 41, 45 (1936).
12 McClintock, Equity 1 42 (1936).
Is McClintock, Equity § 27 (1986).
24 Harris v. Craven, 162 Ore. 1, 91 P. 2d 302 (1939).
